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Abstract
Exploiting data and concurrently protecting sensitive information to whom data belongs is an emerging research area
in data mining. Several methods have been introduced to protect individual privacy and at the same time maximize
data utility. Unfortunately, existing techniques such as differential privacy are not effectively protecting data owner
privacy in the scenarios using visualizable data (e.g., images, videos). Furthermore, such techniques usually result in low
performance with a high number of queries. To address these problems, we propose a dimension reduction-based method
for privacy preservation. This method generates dimensionally-reduced data for performing machine learning tasks and
prevents a strong adversary from reconstructing the original data. In this paper, we first introduce a theoretical tool
to evaluate dimension reduction-based privacy preserving mechanisms, then propose a non-linear dimension reduction
framework using state-of-the-art neural network structures for privacy preservation. In the experiments, we test our
method on popular face image datasets and show that our method can retain data utility and resist data reconstruction,
thus protecting privacy.
Keywords: Generative Adversarial Nets, Auto-encoder, neural-network, privacy preservation, dimension reduction,
access control.
1. Introduction
The applications of machine learning (ML) such as an
on-line system collecting data from multiple data owners
are raising privacy issues. Many types of user data are
being collected in a smart city such as patient records,
salary information, biological characteristics, Internet ac-
cess history, personal images. These types of data can
be widely used in daily recommendation systems, busi-
ness data analysis, or a disease prediction system. How-
ever, collecting and using such data might raise privacy
issues for individuals who contribute their sensitive infor-
mation. Considering the multi-level access control system
of a company using biometric recognition (e.g., facial im-
ages) for granting permission to access data resources, its
staff members may concern their facial information be-
ing vulnerable to adversaries. The utility of face features
can be effectively used in machine learning tasks for au-
thentication purposes. However, leaking the face images
might lead to a privacy problem such as the utilization
of face images to determine the members’ identity by an
adversary. In this study, we consider an access control sys-
tem collecting dimensionally-reduced face images of staff
members to perform authentication task and to provide
permission for members who would like to access the data
resources. We propose a non-linear dimension reduction
framework to decrease data dimension for the authentica-
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tion purpose mentioned above and prevent an adversary
from reconstructing their face images.
Several tools and methods have been developed to
preserve the privacy in machine learning, such as homo-
morphic encryption [1–3], secure multi-party computing
[4, 5], differential privacy (DP) [6–10], compressive
privacy [11–15]. Differential privacy-based methods aim
at preventing leaking individual information caused by
queries. However, they are not designed for a large num-
ber of queries since they require adding a huge amount of
noise for privacy preserving, thus significantly decreasing
the ability to learn meaningful information from data.
Homomorphic encryption-based methods can be used to
privately evaluate a function over the encrypted data
by a third party without accessing to the plain-text
data. Consequently, the privacy of data owners can be
protected. However, due to the high computational cost
and time consumption, they may not work with a very
large dataset normally required in ML applications. To
tackle these problems, we introduce a theoretical tool for
dimension reduction privacy evaluation  − DR privacy.
This tool evaluates the distance between original data
and reconstructed data of a dimension reduction (DR)
mechanism. Because in our tool high distance yields high
level of privacy, DR mechanisms are encouraged to enlarge
the distance. While DP relies on inference uncertainty
to protect sensitive data,  − DR privacy is built on
reconstruction error to evaluate privacy. Unlike DP,
−DR privacy is not negatively impacted by the number
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of queries. Furthermore, in section 6 we recommend
a privacy-preserving system Autoencoder Generative
Adversarial Nets-based Dimension Reduction Privacy
(AutoGAN-DRP) for enhancing data owner privacy and
preserving data utility. The utility herein is evaluated via
machine learning task (e.g., classification) performance.
Generative Adversarial Privacy (GAP) [12] is a similar
method utilizing the minimax algorithm of Generative
Adversarial Nets to preserve privacy and to keep utility
on image datasets. GAP perturbs data within a specific
l2 distance constraint between original and perturbed
data to distort private class labels and at the same time
preserve non-private class labels. However, it does not
protect an image itself, and an adversary can intuitively
infer private label (e.g., identity) from an image. Further,
high correlation between private labels and non-private
labels might result in a dramatic decrease in accuracy
when privacy level is increased. In contrast, our method
protects an image by compressing it into a few dimensions
vector and then transferring without exposing the original
image. Our framework can be applied to different types
of data and used in several practical applications without
heavy computation of encryption and impact of query
number. The proposed framework can be applied directly
to the access control system mentioned above. More elab-
oratively, face images are locally collected, nonlinearly
compressed to achieve DR, and sent to the authentica-
tion center. The authentication server then performs
authentication tasks on the dimensionally-reduced data.
We assume the authentication server is semi-honest,
that is to say it does not deviate from authenticating
protocols while being curious about a specific user’s
identity. The DR framework prevents a strong adversary
who obtains a training dataset and a transformation
model from reconstructing a user’s face image after he or
she sends an authentication request. We perform several
experiments on benchmark datasets to show our method
performance. The experiments illustrate that our method
can achieve high accuracy with very small number of
reduced dimensions and satisfy −DR privacy.
Our work has two main contributions:
• To analytically support privacy guarantee, we intro-
duce a theoretical tool  − DR privacy for privacy
preserving mechanism evaluation.
• We propose a non-linear dimension reduction frame-
work for privacy preservation motivated by Genera-
tive Adversarial Nets [16] and Auto-encoder Nets [17].
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II
summarizes state-of-the-art privacy preservation machine
learning (PPML) techniques. Section III reviews knowl-
edge of deep learning methods including generative ad-
versarial neural nets and Auto-encoder. Section IV de-
scribes the privacy problem through a scenario of leaking
individual information in a facial recognition access con-
trol system. In section V, we introduce the definition of
−DR privacy, a tool to evaluate DR-based privacy pre-
serving mechanisms. Section VI presents our framework
AutoGAN-based Dimension Reduction for Privacy Preser-
vation. Section VII displays the experiment results. Fi-
nally, the conclusion and future work are mentioned in
section VIII.
2. Literature Review
Cryptographic approach: This approach usually ap-
plies to the scenarios where the data owners do not wish
to expose their plain-text sensitive data while asking for
machine learning services from a third-party. The most
common tool used in this approach is fully homomorphic
encryption that supports multiplication and addition oper-
ations over encrypted data, which enable the ability to per-
form a more complex function. However, the high cost of
the multiplicative homomorphic operations renders it dif-
ficult to be applicable on machine learning tasks. In order
to avoid multiplicative homomorphic operations, additive
homomorphic encryption schemes are more widely used
in privacy preserving machine learning (PPML). However,
the limitation of the computational capacity in additive
homomorphic schemes narrows the ability to apply on par-
ticular ML techniques. Thus, such additive homomorphic
encryption-based methods in [1, 2] are only applicable to
simple machine learning algorithms such as decision tree
and naive bayes. In Hesamifard’s work [3],the fully ho-
momorphic encryption is applied to perform deep neural
networks over encrypted data, where the non-linear activa-
tion functions are approximated by polynomials. In secure
multi-party computing (SMC), multiple parties collabo-
rate to compute functions without revealing plain-text to
other parties. A widely-used tool in SMC is garbled cir-
cuit [4], a cryptographic protocol carefully designed for
two-party computation, in which they can jointly evaluate
a function over their sensitive data without the trust of
each other. In [18], Mohammad introduced a SMC pro-
tocol for principle component analysis (PCA) which is a
hybrid system utilizing additive homomorphic and garbled
circuit. In secret sharing techniques [5], a secret s is dis-
tributed over multiple pieces n also called shares, where
the secret can only be recovered by a sufficient amount of
t shares. A good review of secret sharing-based techniques
and encryption-based techniques for PPML is given in [19].
Although these encryption-based techniques can protect
the privacy in particular scenarios, computational cost is
a significant concern. Furthermore, as [19] elaborated, the
high communication cost also poses a big concern for both
techniques.
Non-Cryptographic approach: Differential Privacy
(DP) [20] adds noise to prevent membership inference at-
tack by providing a tool as follows. A mechanism M satis-
fies -differential privacy if for any two neighbor databases
D and D′ which differ by at most one element and any
subset S of the output space of M satisfies Pr[M(D) ∈
2
S] ≤ e.P r[M(D′) ∈ S]. The similarity of query outputs
(whether or not a certain record is included in the dataset)
protects a member information from membership inference
attack. The similarity is guaranteed by the parameter  in
a mechanism in which the smaller  provides a better level
of privacy preservation.[6], [7] propose methods to guaran-
tee -differential privacy by adding noise to outcome of the
weights w∗ = w + η, where η drawn from Laplacian dis-
tribution and adding noise to the objective function of lo-
gistic regression or linear regression models. [8], [9] satisfy
differential privacy by adding noise to the objective func-
tion while training a deep neural network using stochastic
gradient descent as the optimization algorithm. There are
also existing works proposing differential privacy dimen-
sion reduction. Dimension reduction is an important pro-
cess before data goes through machine learning algorithm.
Hence, one can guarantee -differential privacy by perturb-
ing dimension reduction outcome. Principal component
analysis (PCA) whose output is a set of eigenvectors is a
popular method in dimension reduction. The original data
is then represented by its projection on those eigenvectors,
which keeps the largest variance of the data. One can re-
duce the data dimension by eliminating insignificant eigen-
vectors which contain less variance, and apply noise on the
outcome to achieve differential privacy[10]. However, the
downside of these methods is that they are designed for
specific mechanisms and datasets and not working well
with the others. For example, record-level differential pri-
vacy is not effectively used with image dataset as shown
in [21]. Also, the amount of added noise is accumulative
based on the number of queries so that this approach usu-
ally leads to low accuracy results with a high number of
queries.
3. Preliminaries
To enhance the distance between original and recon-
structed data in our DR system, we utilize the structure
of Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [16] for data
manipulation and deep Auto-encoder [17] as a reconstruc-
tion method. The following sections briefly review Auto-
encoder and GAN.
3.1. Auto-encoder
Auto-encoder, an artificial neural network, is aimed at
learning a lower dimension representation of an unsuper-
vised data or generative models. Auto-encoder can be used
for denoising image data and reducing dimension. Auto-
encoder can be implemented by two fully connected neural
network components: encoder and decoder. The encoder
and decoder perform reverse operations. The encoder in-
put is normally original data while the decoder output is
expected to be similar to the input data. The middle layer
which has smaller number of neurons than that of the input
is extracted as a representation of dimensionally-reduced
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Figure 1: Attack Model
data. The auto-encoder training process can be described
as a minimization problem of a loss function:
L(x, g(f(x)))
where x is the data and g(.) is a function of the framework
which could be the mean square error between input and
output.
3.2. GAN
Generative Adversarial Nets is aimed at approximat-
ing distribution pd of a dataset via generative models over
data x. GAN simultaneously trains two generative models
G and D in which G inputs are sampled from a prior dis-
tribution pz(z). G generates fake samples similar to the
real samples. At the same time, D is trained to differ-
entiate between fake samples and real samples and send
feedback to G for improvement. GAN can be formed as a
two-player minimax game with value function V(G,D):
min max
G,D
V (G,D) =Ex pd(x)[log(D(x))]+
Ez pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
In practice, the two GAN components, generator and
discriminator are built on two fully connected neural net-
works. The loss function of G is to reduce the D accuracy.
Meanwhile, the loss function of D is to increase the ac-
curacy of differentiating fake samples from real samples.
These two components are trained until the discrimina-
tor cannot distinguish between generated samples and real
samples.
4. Problem
4.1. Problem statement
We introduce the problem through the practical sce-
nario mentioned in Section 1. Staff members in a com-
3
Input Space Output Space
𝑥
𝑥′𝑅(𝑥′)
𝐹(𝑥)
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑥, ො𝑥
ො𝑥
Figure 2: DR projection and reconstruction.
pany request access to its data resources, such as web-
sites and data servers with different privileges through a
face recognition access control system. The system collects
each member’s facial features and sends them to a central
server to determine his/her access eligibility. We consider
that the system has three levels of privilege (i.e., single-
level, four-level, eight-level) corresponding to three mem-
ber groups. We assume the authentication server is semi-
honest (it obeys the work procedure but might be used to
infer personal information). An adversary in the authen-
tication center can reconstruct the face features to achieve
plain-text face images and determine members’ identity.
4.2. Threat model
In the above scenario, we consider that a very strong ad-
versary who has access to the model and training dataset
attempts to reconstruct the original face images for infer-
ring a specific member’s identity. Our attack model can
be represented in Figure 1. The adversary utilizes training
data and facial features to identify a member identity by
reconstructing the original face using Auto-encoder nets.
Rather than using fully connected neural network, we im-
plement Auto-encoder on convolutional neural network to
create an effective model for image dataset. Our goal is
to design a data dimension reduction method for reducing
data dimension and resisting full reconstruction of original
data.
5. -Dimension Reduction Privacy (-DR Privacy)
In this section, we introduce the Dimension Reduc-
tion Privacy (DR-Privacy), and define a formal definition
of the -DR Privacy to mathematically quantify/evaluate
the mechanisms designed to preserve the DR-Privacy via
dimension reduction. The DR-Privacy aims to achieve
privacy-preserving via dimension reduction, which refers
to transforming the data into a lower dimensional sub-
space, such that concealing the private information while
preserving the underlying probabilistic characteristics,
which can be utilized for machine learning purposes. To
quantify the DR-Privacy and guide us to design such DR
functions, we define -DR Privacy as follows.
Definition 1: (-DR Privacy) A Dimension Reduc-
tion Function F (·) satisfies −DR Privacy if for each i.i.d.
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𝑋’
෠𝑋
Classifier(C)
Discriminator(D)
X/Target
Target Dist
D
C
RG
𝑋
Figure 3: AutoGAN-DRP
m-dimension input sample x drawn from the same distri-
bution D, and for a certain distance measure dist(·), we
have
E[|dist(x, xˆ)|] ≥  (1)
where  ≥ 0, x′ = F (x), xˆ = R(x′), and R(·) is the Recon-
struction Function.
For instance, as shown in Fig. 2, given original data x,
our framework utilizes certain dimension reduction func-
tion F (x) to transform the original data x into the trans-
formed data x′. The adversaries aim to design a corre-
sponding reconstruction function R(x′) such that the re-
constructed data xˆ would be closed/similar to the original
data x. DR-Privacy aims to design/develop such dimen-
sion reduction functions, that the distance between the
original data and its reconstructed data would be large
enough to protect the privacy of the data owner.
6. Methodology
6.1. AutoGAN-based Dimension Reduction for Privacy
Preserving (AutoGAN-DRP)
To tackle the problem, we propose a deep learning
framework for transforming face images to lower dimen-
sion vectors which are hard to be clearly reconstructed.
The dimensionally-reduced data can be sent to the authen-
tication server as an authentication request. We consider
an adversarial as a re-constructor implemented by a Deep
Auto-encoder structure. To prevent fully reconstructing
images, the framework utilizes the discriminator in GAN
[16] to direct reconstructed data to a desired target dis-
tribution. In this work, the target distribution is sampled
from Gaussian distribution and the mean is the average of
the whole training data. After the transformation projects
the data into a lower dimension domain, the re-constructor
can only partially reconstruct the data. Therefore, the
adversary might not be able to recognize an individual’s
identity. To maintain data utility, we use feedback from
a classifier. The entire framework can enlarge the dis-
tance between original data and its reconstruction to pre-
serve individual privacy and retain significant data infor-
mation. The dimensionally-reduced transformation model
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is extracted from the framework and provided to clients for
reducing their facial image dimensions. The classification
model will be used in an authentication center that clas-
sifies whether an authentication request is valid to have
access {1} or not {0}.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for stochastic gradient descent
training of  -DR privacy.
Input: Training dataset D.
Parameter: learning rate αr, αd, αc, αg, training steps
nr, nd, nc, ng
A constraint for −DR
Output: Transformation Model
Initialization.
1: for number of global training iteration do
2: Randomly, sample a mini batch from target distri-
bution and label t.
3: Randomly, sample mini batch of data x and corre-
sponding label y
4: for i = 0 to nr iterations do
5: Update the Reconstruction and Generator:
ϕi+1 = ϕi − αr∇ϕLR(ϕi,x)
θl+1 = θl − αr∇ϕLR(ϕi,x)
6: end for
7: for j = 0 to nd iterations do
8: Update the Discriminator parameter:
ωj+1 = ωj − αd∇ωLD(ωj ,x,t)
9: end for
10: for k = 0 to nc iterations do
11: Update the Classifier parameter:
φk+1 = φk − αc∇φLC(φk,x,y)
12: end for
13: for l = 0 to ng iterations do
14: Update the Generator parameter:
θl+1 = θl − αg∇θLG(θl,x,t,y)
15: end for
16: end for
17: return
We formulate the problem as follows: Let D be the pub-
lic training dataset. (xi, yi) are the i samples in the dataset
which each sample xi has d features and a ground truth
label yi. The system is aimed at learning a dimension
reduction transformation F (.) which transforms the data
from d dimensions to d′ dimensions in which d′ << d.
Let D′ be the dataset in lower dimension domain. The
dimensionally-reduced data should keep significant infor-
mation to work with different types of machine learning
tasks and should resist against the reconstruction or infer-
ence from data owner information.
Our proposed framework can learn a DR function F (.)
that preserves privacy at certain value of  evaluated by
−DR privacy. The larger distance implies higher level of
privacy. Figure-3 represents our learning system in which
D′ is generated from a Generator G. D′ can be classi-
fied by a classifier C and can resist data reconstruction
of an aggressive attack implemented by a trainable Re-
constructor R. We use a binary classifier for single-level
authentication system and multi-class classifier for multi-
level authentication system. The Discriminator D is a
neural network working with G as a minimax game. The
Discriminator aims to differentiate the reconstructed data
from a target distribution and send feedback to Generator.
The Generator is trained so that it directs reconstructed
data distribution close to the target distribution to ensure
a distance between reconstructed and original data. To en-
large the distance, the selected target distribution should
be different from the original data distribution. The prob-
lem becomes finding an optimal solution for the Generator,
as shown in (2):
θ∗ = arg min
θ
(αarg min
φ
LC − βarg min
ω
LD
− γarg min
ϕ
LR + C())
(2)
Where α, β, γ are weights of components in the objective
function and freely tuned. C() is a constraint function
with respect to hyper-parameter .
The re-constructor plays its role as an aggressive adver-
sary attempting to reconstruct original data by training
R using known data. The loss function of R is the mean
square error of original training data and reconstructed
data, as displayed in (3):
LR =
n∑
i
(xi − xˆi)2 (3)
The classifier C keeps the performance of the classifica-
tion task in a lower dimension domain and sends feedback
to G. The classifier loss function (4) is defined by a cross
entropy of the class target y and predicted class yˆ. LD (5)
is the cross-entropy loss of the Discriminator.
LC = −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
yij log(yˆij) y, yˆ ∈ {0, 1, ..,m− 1} (4)
LD = −
n∑
i
(ti log(tˆi) + (1− ti) log(1− tˆi)) t, tˆ ∈ {0, 1}
(5)
Where m denotes the number of classes and n denotes
the number of samples.
6.2. Optimization With Constraint
In order to meet a certain level of distance, we use 
as a hyper-parameter to be tuned in the system. We use
an constrained optimization method to put a constraint 
on the Generator as a part of its objective function. We
choose the exterior method as our solution. Considering a
constrained problem:
minimize
x
f(x) s.t x ∈ Ω
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Figure 5: Distance Measurement Result { 7 dimensions, Single-Level}
It could be approximated as a unconstrained problem:
minimizef(x) + γC(x)
Where C : Rn → R is a penalty function and γ is penalty
parameter. C is continuous, C(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Rn and
C(x) = 0 iff x ∈ Ω. The penalty function in G loss function
becomes
C = γ.max(0, dist− ) (6)
where dist is defined as the distance between original data
and reconstructed data.
6.3. Algorithms
Algorithms 1 describes how we train the entire frame-
work. The framework contains four components and they
are trained one by one. First, similar to training an
auto-encoder, the Re-constructor is trained in nr itera-
tions and Generator parameters are concurrently updated
while other components are fixed. Second, the Discrimi-
nator is trained while the others fixed. Third, the Clas-
sifier is trained in nc iterations. Fourth, the Generator is
trained in ng iterations. We repeat this training process
until it reaches a number of global training iterations or
the weights are very close to their previous state.
6
1Figure 6: Visualization Samples of Original Images and Correspond-
ing Reconstructions on Yale B and AT&T
{SingleLevel, 7 dimensions }
7. Experiments and Discussion
In this section, we demonstrate our experiments on two
popular supervised face image datasets: the Extended Yale
Face Database B [22] and AT&T [23]. The Euclidean dis-
tance is used to measure the distance between original and
reconstructed images: dist(x, xˆ) = ||x− xˆ||2.
7.1. Experiment Setup
The Extended Yale Face Database B contains 2,470
grayscale images of 38 human subjects under different il-
lumination conditions and their identity label. In this
dataset, the image size is 168x192 pixels. In our experi-
ment, we crop these images to 168x168 pixels. The AT&T
dataset has 400 face images of 40 subjects. We crop the
image size to 92x92 pixels. All pixel values are scaled to
the range of [0,1]. We randomly select 20% of each sub-
ject’s images for testing dataset.
The Generator and Re-constructor in Figure 3 are im-
plemented as convolutional neural networks. Each of them
has two convolutional layers and two fully connected hid-
den layers. Discriminator and Classifier are built on fully
connected neural network with three hidden layers. Hy-
perbolic Tangent function is used as activation function for
hidden layers. Each component is trained in 300 local iter-
ations, and the entire system is trained in 1000 iterations
with the learning rate of 0.01 for global loop. The target
distribution is drawn from Gaussian distribution (with the
covariance value of 0.05 and the mean is the average of the
training data).
Figure 7: GENKI Facial Expression Accuracy Vs Distance using
GAP and AutoGAN-DRP
For the single-level authentication system in the sce-
nario, we consider half of the subjects in the dataset are
valid to access the database system while the rest are in-
valid. We randomly divide the dataset into two groups of
subject and labels their images to {1} or {0} depending
on their access permission. For the cases of multi-level au-
thentication system experiments, we divide the subjects
into four groups and eight groups so that the authenti-
cation server becomes four-class and eight-class classifier
respectively.
7.2. Utility
We use accuracy metric to evaluate the utility of
dimensionally-reduced data. The testing dataset is tested
with the classifier in our framework. Figure 4 illustrates
the accuracies for different dimensions from one to seven.
Overall, the accuracies improve when the dimension num-
ber increases. The accuracy result for single-level authen-
tication system on YaleB starts from 97% with one dimen-
sion and reaches 100% with only five dimensions. As the
dimension number is reduced from 28,224 (168x168) to 5,
we can achieve a compression ratio of 5,644 yet achieve
100% of accuracy. In eight-level and four-level authentica-
tion, we can achieve accuracies of 97% and 96% with seven
dimensions. Testing on AT&T dataset, we could achieve
77% of accuracy with only one dimension and 96% with
seven dimensions for single-level authentication. This im-
plies we could gain the compression ratio of 4,032 (from
92x92 to 7 dimensions) and maintain a high accuracy.
These figures for four-level and eight-level authentication
system at seven dimensions are 90% and 81% respectively.
As shown in the figure 4, our method could achieve a very
high result with a low number of dimension in terms of
accuracy.
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7.3. Privacy
Figure 5 illustrates the average distances between origi-
nal images and reconstructed images (taken from the out-
put of the Re-constructor) on testing data with different 
constraints for seven dimensions and single-level authenti-
cation. The achieved distances (red lines) are always larger
than the hyper-parameter  (black dotted lines) where  is
less than 0.063 for YaleB and 0.384 for AT&T. Due to the
fact that the Re-constructor is trained using the training
dataset (we consider the adversary can reach the model
and the training data), our framework can only force the
distance within a certain range. Specifically, the distances
varies from 0.059 to 0.063 for YaleB and from 0.03839 to
0.03841 for AT&T. The intersection between the red line
and the dotted black line points out the largest distance
our framework can achieve. The method satisfies  −DR
privacy with  values of 0.0384 for YaleB and 0.063 for
AT&T. Figure 6 demonstrates some samples and their
corresponding reconstructions in single-level authentica-
tion and seven dimensions. The reconstructed images are
nearly identical, thus making it visually hard to recognize
the identity of an individual.
8. Comparison to GAP[12]
In this section, we compare our framework with GAP.
We attempt to visualize AutoGAN-DRP and GAP to
highlight their similarities and differences. We also show
our experiment results of the two methods on the same
dataset. Our work shares many similarities with GAP,
such as utilizing minimax algorithms of Generative Ad-
versarial Nets, applying the state-of-the-art convolution
neural nets for image datasets, considering l2 norm dis-
tance (i.e., distortion in GAP, privacy measurement in
AutoGAN-DRP) between the original data and possible
exposed data. Specifically, both GAP and AutoGAN-
DRP consider the difference between original and exposed
images. This difference is understood as the distortion
between original and perturbed images in GAP and the
distance between original and reconstructed images in
AutoGAN-DRP. Both of the distance and distortion are
computed with l2 norm distance. In this context, the dis-
tance and distortion refer to the same measurement and
have the same meaning. To be consistent, we use the term
distance to present this measurement in the rest of this
section.
Figure 8 illustrates the visualization of AutoGAN-DRP
and GAP. In AutoGAN-DRP, the privacy is assessed based
on how well an adversary can reconstruct the original data
and measured by the distance between original and re-
constructed data. The dimensionally-reduced data is re-
constructed using the state-of-the-art neural network (an
Auto-encoder). The larger the distance is, the more pri-
vacy can be achieved. Further, if the reconstructed images
are blurry, privacy can be preserved since it is hard to vi-
sually determine an individual identity. The data utility
is quantified by the accuracy of identity classification task
over dimensionally-reduced data which captures the most
significant data information. Meanwhile, GAP perturbs
images with a certain distortion constraint to achieve pri-
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vacy. It evaluates data utility by the classification accu-
racy of non-private label and assesses privacy by the clas-
sification accuracy of private label. Similar to AutoGAN-
DRP, the high distortion is most likely to yield high level
of privacy. In GAP, however, high distortion might dra-
matically reduce the classification accuracy of non-private
label. This might be caused by the high correlation be-
tween private and non-private labels. This difference en-
ables AutoGAN-DRP to preserve more utility than GAP
at the same distortion level, as the experiment result (dis-
played in Figure 7) reveals.
In the experiment, we reproduce a prototype of Trans-
posed Convolutional Neural Nets Privatizer (TCNNP) in
GAP using materials and source code provided by [12]. We
also modify our framework to make it as similar to TC-
NNP as possible. Specifically, a combination of two con-
volutional layers with ReLU activation function and two
fully connected neural network layers are used for imple-
menting the Generator similar to TCNNP. Our Classifier
is constructed on two convolutional layers and two fully
connected hidden layers similar to the Adversary in GAP.
We also test our framework on GENKI, the same dataset
with GAP. The utility is evaluated by the accuracy of facial
expression classification (a binary classification). It should
be noted that our framework have been shown to work on
different datasets with multi-class classification, which is
more challenging and comprehensive. Figure 7 shows the
accuracy results of GAP and AutoGAN-DRP for GENKI
dataset. AutoGAN-DRP achieves distances ranging from
0.037 to 0.039 for different dimensions from one to seven.
At the same range of distance (distortion per pixel), GAP
achieves accuracy of only 72% while AutoGAN-DRP gains
accuracy rates starting from 77% to 91% for different num-
ber of dimensions. It becomes evident that our method can
achieve higher accuracy than that of GAP at the same dis-
tortion level.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a mathematics tool −DR
to evaluate privacy preserving mechanisms. We also pro-
pose a non-linear dimension reduction framework. This
framework projects data on lower dimension domain in
which it prevents data reconstruction and preserve data
utility. The dimensionally-reduced data can be used effec-
tively for the machine learning tasks such as classification.
Our future works plan to extend the framework for adapt-
ing with different types of data, such as time series and
categorical data. We will apply different metrics to com-
pute the distance other than l2 norm and investigate the
framework on several applications in security systems and
data collaborative contributed systems.
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